ABSTRACT By using wrapping techniques, malicious developers can build a packed app (or packer) to deceive the basic analysis layer and successfully publish it through Android's application distribution service (such as Google Play) before being detected by an in-depth analysis process. Although a thorough dynamic analysis can help in identifying packers, it is impossible to analyze mass numbers of apps in a short time. Regarding static analysis, most of the existing research on identifying packers depends on the signature of packers such as files or directories. In this paper, we propose a model for detecting packers through static analysis of various contents in an Android Package file. By applying entropy-based algorithms in conjunction with common classification solutions, our model can provide output about whether a target app has the potential to be a packer or not through prediction values. Compared with previous solutions with absolute results, the relative results could increase the likelihood of identifying variants from known packers. The results of our experiment have shown that our model can identify potential packers with high accuracy. Our proposed model can help improve the detection of potential packers as well as contribute new research directions for detecting packer by static analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Android analysis, a static approach is a method of analyzing the extracted source code to determine the maliciousness of the target application (or app). Compared to dynamic analysis approach, which depends on a complicated process in setup analysis environments, static analysis often yields high performance in both volume and speed. However, static solutions often have trouble in analyzing applications that are embedded with packing solution. Applications involving packing solutions are called as packers. Packing services provide the source code wrapping solution for the ultimate purpose of protecting the original source code from being analyzed. This solution involves altering the structure and logic of the original APK file (also known as the Android Package), plus the additional layers of encapsulation and security code. Although the packaging services are provided for the purpose of protecting applications from being
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Xiangxue Li. analyzed, the research by Duan et al. [1] has shown that malware developers have been steadily utilizing the packaging services to create malicious packers.
The existence of malicious packers is a matter that has been discussed in research for a long time. Before Duan et al. [1] published their research, other researchers also showed the existence of packers along with studies on how to extract hidden source code in packers. In 2012, research from Zhou et al. [2] pointed out the existence of dynamic native code loading, the premise of packing techniques, in the DroidKungFu malware sample. In 2014, Poeplau et al. [3] introduced their research on dynamic code-loading contained in many apps. The author's research has shown that various code-loading techniques have been applied by a large number of applications on Google Play. In the same year, Yu [4] published studies related to packer families and also introduced empirical detection methods. The following year, Zhang et al. [5] introduced DexHunter, a tool for extracting original code from packers. Appspear, another solution to extract and assemble hidden Dalvik Execution (DEX) files, was also introduced by Yang et al. [6] in the same year.
Although the existing solutions proved effective against packers, they still require the execution of target apps in the Android environment. Because of that, they are not adequate for analysis of a large number of applications. In fact, analysts still need to rely on static analysis to filter out potentially packers. Through advanced detection of packers using static analysis, analysts could minimize the number of applications that need dynamic analysis run on them. Up until now, little research has been involved in identifying packers through a static approach. Android identification (APKiD) is an open source project that provides analysts with a general view of the application [7] , [8] . APKiD also gives a decision about whether the analyzed application belongs to a certain packer family or not. Yet, according to our experiment in section IV-B, this approach is unable to detect custom or new variants of packers. Meanwhile, the study by Duan et al. [1] on packers confirmed that the custom packers accounted for 70.35% of all packers. These studies imply that finding a more flexible solution to detect packers is essential.
So far, the static analysis of Android applications has the following problems:
• Most static analysis solutions used reverse engineering tools, such as Apktool, to obtain the source code. This process consumes a significant amount of time, requires storage space, and has the potential to return errors during the reverse process.
• Another approach is to analyze the binary data of the APK file directly. However, analyzing an entire APK file without going through the filtering out of the jamming data could lead to inaccurate predictions.
• Regarding detecting packers via static analysis, current solutions only offer judgments about whether an application has packers or not based on rule-based signatures of packers. These methods have a high potential to result in false negative results when the signatures of packers are replaced with other names or versions. In this paper, we present a solution inspired by sdhash, a famous approximate matching (also referred to as ''Fuzzy Hashing'') algorithm. Essentially, our model includes the following steps: Filtering out key features of the inputted data, transforming the features into vectors, and classifying using common classification methods. To simplify the data collecting stage, APK files were extracted by the unzip tool instead of Apktool. For each context inside an APK, our model provides predictions on whether they could be a packer or not.
The structure of this article is as follows. The next section briefly summarizes previous studies related to the idea of the paper. The third section will describe the main idea of this paper along with the discussion related to the proposed model. Section 4 represents the implementation process and experimental results that come up from our design. This chapter also includes our insights on this approach such as strengths and limitations. Section 5 provides key issues of the model and how to improve the model in further research. Section 6 provides general conclusions about the paper and about our future studies on packers.
II. RELATED WORKS
In this section, we will focus on the knowledge that motivates the idea of this article. First of all, heuristic analyzes have been studied to detect packers, which are the basis for our classification of packer traits. Follow up is our research on approximate matching in similar research such as malware detection. We also provide our study on approximate matching in the sub section. These studies helped us to design the appropriate solution for the proposed model. In the last section, we introduce the research about existing application classification methods, mostly applied for malware classification. The research helped us to find out the most suitable approach for extracting and classifying packers.
A. RESEARCHES ON ANDROID PACKER IDENTIFICATIONS
So far, there have been a lot of research and solutions related to packers, in which most solutions use dynamic analysis or heuristic analysis. Yu [4] presented the methods for detecting packers, based on traits that exist in the library, META-INFO, and assets directories inside the target APK file. The authors also noticed the change of APK file structure in packers. Kim et al. [9] also pointed out the anomaly of the Android manifest and classes.dex files, along with the existence of external executable files (such as external.jar). In 2016, Liao et al. [10] introduced the idea of a framework to classify packed Android applications, thereby reducing the number of Android applications needed for analysis. However, their ideas still depend on dynamic analysis and only collect a small amount of information at the static analysis stage. DexHunter's author also pointed out a list of files that were embedded by known packing services as well as a list of strings commonly used by them [5] .
B. INTRODUCTION TO SDHASH AND HISTOGRAM-BASED TLSH SOLUTIONS
Originated by the idea of Hans P. L. since 1958, hashing algorithms have become so popular until now. Fundamentally, hashing algorithms help produce a fixed output from an input of any size. However, traditional hashes have the downside not to point out the gap between the hashes. By combining with distance algorithms plus hashing blocks, approximate matching (or also known as fuzzy hashing) algorithms can provide the difference between the original hash and a modified hash. In 2010, Roussev [11] introduced fuzzy hashing algorithm called sdhash, a block-based hashing (BBH) algorithm. BBH calculates hashes from a fixed block size of code by utilizing Shannon entropy algorithm. To produce similarity digests, he used with the Bloom Filter algorithm to check for integrity of hashes list. Another approximate matching approaches is Trend Micro Locality Sensitive Hash (TLSH), a Fuzzy hashing project developed by Trend Micro. TLSH based on the Locality Sensitive Hash (LSH) algorithm to check for similarity through data clustering [12] . Basically, VOLUME 7, 2019 TLSH extracts small features and put into the histogram. At the end, the distance point between digests is also calculated based on the distances of the histograms.
1) APPROXIMATE MATCHING ON APPLICATION ANALYSIS
In 2011, Jang et al. [13] proposed a solution using n-grams combined with feature hashing to find correlated malware features. In 2013, Hu et al. [14] proposed n-gram based combining with the semantic of byte-code for regular malware analysis. The same solution has been used in many previous studies and proved to be an effective method [15] , [16] . In 2013, the authors have provided a solution for malware detection using the Bayesian classification [17] . In 2015, Li et al. [18] proposed a new fuzzy hashing fingerprint computation named as nextGen hash. The algorithm has applied feature hashing to the 5-grams of code section sequences in malware samples to create bit-array fingerprints. In the same year, Faruki et al. [19] used an algorithm that is similar to sdhash to find the similarities between malware families. While the use of n-grams can be used to distinguish between malware and benign apps, the detection of packer code existence in the byte-code is a distinct problem. The main reason is that the existence of packer code in the byte-code can occupy the whole (loader DEX) or just in a small code. For that reason, synthesis and computation based on k-grams (k ⊂ n) components might lead to inaccurate statements. As for static analysis, the use of fuzzy rules also shown effective in many studies for pattern classification [20] - [23] . This method has also been utilized by APKiD for packer detection.
III. PROPOSED MODEL
In this section, we present a solution related to detecting packers that only depend on static analysis. There are some insights for us on designing a better packer identification model only through static analysis:
• Static analysis is capable of handling a large number of applications than dynamic analysis.
• Static analysis cannot collect specific actions of packers but can focus on tracking the sign of presence from wrapper and loader, thereby classifying applications that need to be prioritized for dynamic analysis.
• Enhancing the effectiveness of static analysis will make decisions from dynamic analysis more reliable. Furthermore, through previous studies about packers [4] , [5] , [24] , we have summarized the characteristics of the packers:
• Packer services often apply changes to one or more of the following APK file structures: Manifest (for launching the wrapper or loader class), DEX byte-code (to call libraries or turn it into a wrapper/loader), additional libraries or assets.
• Some packers (such as Ijiami) could encrypt the original source code and leave only wrapper byte-code (DEX file).
• The native library provided by packers are typically ELF and DATA formats and there are multiple versions of the same packer family. Based on the summaries above, we find that because the packer tends to change and add DEX, manifest, and assets files. Focusing on analyzing these files will help us get the most relevant analysis results. In this section, we divide the proposed model into subsections so that we can discuss in more detail about our design as well as lead readers to better understand the idea.
A. DESIGN OF THE SOLUTIONS
With raw data obtained from APK, we acknowledged of two main types based on the number of source code packers contained in each type of data. The first is the data in which the source code packer occupies the majority, most of which are native library files (resemblance type of data). The second type is the type of data in which packer source code takes up a very small portion, such as the manifest file (containment type of data). There are also data types, such as dex.classes files, that are likely to be partially modified version of original source code or replaced entirely by a DEX loader. The definition of resemblance and containment was introduced by Broder A. for classifying the types of similarities in documents [25] .
In order to provide a proper solution for both types of data, we decided to filter out features that represent the extracted data. Specifically, we applied the entropy-based algorithm, known as statistically-improbable selection, to extract feature vectors representing a set of binary data. This method was originally used by Amazon to find the keywords representing a document and later applied by Roussev V. in his approximately matching algorithm. In this paper, we use the entropy solution to filter out features that represent a data block to improve the speed of analysis. We will provide detail discussion on the entropy method in section III-B.
For string-based data like Android manifests, that often come with limited size, we generated those data type into string-based vectors. We will explain the algorithm for both extraction approaches in the section III-D.
As for classifying the features, we propose two approaches. For non-uniform data such as manifest and assets, we apply the mutual information algorithm in combination with K nearest neighbors (K-NN) classification to filter out representative features. As for byte-code, we have applied the binning method and compared the histogram to identify the application containing the packing technique.
The Fig.1 illustrates the combination between stringbased extraction and mutual information. Fig.2 illustrate the combination between entropy-based feature extraction and histogram-based classification.
B. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF ENTROPY-BASED SOLUTIONS
Roussev [11] states: ''We view binary data as a syntactic entity and make no attempt to parse or interpret it. This approach has obvious limitations, but is motivated by the need to develop generic, high-throughput methods that can rapidly filter large amounts of data''. Thus, by utilization of the algorithm in the ''Selecting Statistically-Improbable Features'' section of [11] , we can filter out a sequence of entropy features with each represent a 64-bytes sequence. The application of the Statistically-Improbable Features algorithm has the advantage of giving a sequence of entropy values of maximum length of n/64 (when threshold is not applied) to represent a binary with length n. Although the data extraction process will take a bit longer, however, this will improve performance in mutual information computation as well as the process of comparing data from input with mutual information. From testing on a sample, we found that the algorithm took 2 seconds for processing a 1MB binary. It also took 4 seconds for classifying 1 binary with n/64. On the other hand, it took an impractical time measure (more than 1 minutes) for processing same file with n length. A disadvantage of this algorithm is it is an one-way solution and we cannot retrieve original values from the entropy of sequence.
However, the output of entropy-based algorithm is sufficient for the purpose of our model in finding specific patterns in different objects.
C. SAMPLES PRE-PROCESSING
This section provides explanation of how we collect raw data from an APK file. For extracting content of APK files, analysts often use an open-source reverse engineering tool like Apktool [26] . With that, analysts could acquire manifest file, assets, as well as smali source code (Human readable code that extracted from DEX files). The extraction process from DEX to Smali often requires large amount of time for performing reverse engineering and the source code often occupies a large portion of storage space. Because of that reason, we decided to only unzip the APK into non-reversed engineering files. For each APK file, we focus on gathering the following information: DEX files (binary format), libraries and assets (binary format). For the manifest information, we used apkanalyzer (provided by Google) to extract data in XML format [27] . By applying only ZIP extraction methods, we could save a lot of time and storage space.
D. FEATURE EXTRACTION AND TRANSFORMATION
There are three parts of information that we extracted in an APK file: 1) Manifest, 2) Libraries and assets, and 3) byte-code.
1) FEATURE EXTRACTION FOR MANIFEST FILES
Android manifest file is an XML-based document in which each attribute follows with the ''name: value'' format. Except for value field, others information in the manifest file need to be followed with Android design. Because of that reason, we have performed the removal of noises such as XML tags, common android tags, and leaving only the value information contained within the double quotes. Since most of the information is in the name-space format as well as words plus dots, we decide to strip the dots and turn value into a string of words. With that, we have minimized the miscalculation rate for the subsequent process. In order to collect the assets and libraries information, we determine whether they are binary or not and only extract feature from a binary file only. The entropy-based algorithm is applied into the binary files to extract a vector of represented features. The Fig.3 illustrates our approach on collecting entropy-based feature vector. while index < len(popularRankList) do 10: feature, Rpop = popularRankList [index] 11:
if Rpop > threashold then 12: output.append(feature) 13 :
returnoutput Algorithm 2 illustrates the process for extracting the features for binary data. The arguments like byteLen, window, and threshold are set similar to the sdhash. The popular function is used to calculating the popular rank of the entropy score that is returned by shanonEntropy function. The detail of how-to calculating entropy score and popular rank is explained with example in [11] .
Because performing analysis on all files might result in consuming of the computing resource, we have come up with two possibilities for choosing files as assets for the analysis: 1) Based on the type of file. There are 3 popular options: ELF, ZIP, and DATA and 2) Based on the file extension which we refer to from the previous research papers [4] , [5] , [24] . There are 5 popular options:.so,.zip,.jar,.bin,.dat. Option 1 will cover most of the files on assets and libraries folder at the price of reducing performance. Because of that reason, we recommend option 2 which cover most of known packer's traits with better performance than option 1.
3) ANALYSIS ON SIMILARITY MATCHING IN BYTE-CODE
Because byte-code is often obfuscated, the classification of related strings does not produce accurate results. predict ← get_common_packer(match) 12: return predict
In addition, the use of n-grams often requires high computational efficiency, which goes against the performance advantage of static analysis. In this paper, we propose a byte-code analysis which is a combination of entropy-based feature extraction and histogram-based classification (or En-gram, in short). Our idea is motivated by sdhash with the application of Shannon-entropy, precedence rank, and popularity score to find a list of statistically-improbable features that represent the inputted data. After that, we transformed it into a feature vector through binning (or bucketing) method to be able to serve the identification.
E. DECISION MAKING
In this section, we present solutions for classifying the transformed data from section III-D.
1) CLASSIFICATION OF SIMILARITY MATCHING IN LIBRARIES AND ASSETS
For libraries and assets, we applied the same mutual classification as Android manifest, the only different is the entropybased feature vectors instead of string-based vectors.
The algorithm 3 illustrates our classification process. The function mi_cal for performing mutual information. The mi_cal method returns a list of a 1-1 mapping between the asset from the target and the name of packer that matched with the asset. The get_common_packer returns the most common packer among all assets. For example, assuming that A = a 1 , a 2 , .., a n as list of APK assets and P = p 1 , p 2 , .., p m as number of packer family. The return of mi_cal will be M = (a 1 : p 2 , a 2 : p 1 , a 3 : p 2 , . . .). The get_common_packer method will count all packer's decision in M as C = (p 1 : 1, p 2 : 2, . . .) and calculate the max(C) to return the most common packer.
2) ANALYSIS OF SIMILARITY MATCHING IN MANIFEST
By applying the mutual information algorithm to the stringbased feature vectors, we could filter out vectors of features that are common in each packer family. We called those feature vectors as signature vectors. In order to classify an input manifest, we performed the following steps:
• Convert inputted manifest into feature vectors by counting number of data occurrences.
• Calculates mutual information between inputted vector and signature vectors.
• If there is mutual information exists between inputted vector and a signature vector, consider the inputted manifest as packer. This step is same with prediction process in assets which we illustrated with algorithm 3.
3) ANALYSIS OF SIMILARITY MATCHING IN BYTE-CODE
We applied classification solutions to identify packers from the results provided by binning methods. After testing through common solutions, we found that the results given by SVM classification provide better prediction for our bytecode feature vectors.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS
In this section, we explain the experiment process and provide discussions on the results. The subsections include:
• Pre-processing stage Provide information on how we prepare the dataset.
• Rule-based Packer Identification on Modified Packers We conduct experiments to determine the effectiveness of APKiD against modified packers.
• Experiments on Android Byte-code, Assets, and Manifest Provide the detail explanation on how we applied our model on real samples and the effectiveness of each approach.
• Experiments on Integrating the Model Provide our ideal about integrating three models as well as determining the threshold value.
• Comparison with Existing Tool Provide the comparison result between our model and APKiD, which is a representative of rule-based method.
A. PRE-PROCESSING STAGE
We have built a database by collecting from various samples sharing community such as VirusShare [28] . Based on the database, our plan in this stage is to extract two type of datasets to serve different comparison purposes. The first dataset includes the 501 packers which are modified by us to rename known assets of packers to other names. We called this dataset as Modified Packer dataset (MPD). These samples are expected to evade the rule-based detection from APKiD tool in the next stage. Also, 60% of these samples will be used for training our model, and other 40% will be used for the validation process. The second dataset includes the samples that were classified by APKiD as non-packer. We labeled those as Potential Non-Packer dataset (NPD). These samples will be analyzed by our model to compare with the output from APKiD.
As we have mentioned in section III-C, we used unzip tool to extract all APK files and collected binary files such as DEX and assets. After the collecting stage, we labeled 501 packers of different families. We also confirmed the existence of packer's traits based on dynamic analysis tools such as kisskiss [29] in combining with manual analysis based on known traits provided from other researchers [4] , [5] . Before the modification process, we conduct duplicated check in our packer samples through the use of md5sum tool. The m5sum is a Linux tool to calculate MD5 hash output from an input file.
For the modification process, we executed a script to rename the known assets in packer samples. Algorithm 4 illustrates our method of modification a packer. replace(newTrace, trace) 15: index = index + 1 16: repack(apkPath)
Algorithm 4 Method for

B. RULE-BASED PACKER IDENTIFICATION ON MODIFIED PACKERS
In this experiment, we conducted identification process with APKiD against MPD dataset to prove our standpoint on rule-based analysis in section I. As a result, we were able to prevent APKiD from detecting 424 out of 501 modified packer samples. APKiD managed to detect 77 other samples which contain Packer for eXecutables (UPX) traits and packer's traits that stored in extra ZIP files. The results showed that although there was no change in the content, it is sufficient to evade rule-based method. As extra research, we conducted another experiment for the purpose of making APKiD identify a harmless sample as a packer. Specifically, we created a Zip file with the name fake_bangle. Inside of the zip file includes empty files named libsecexe.so and AndroidManifest.xml. APKiD was deceived and identified our fake file as Bangcle packer. With the results returned by this experiment, we certain that identifying packers through rule-based signatures still contain limitations.
C. EXPERIMENTS ON ANDROID BYTE-CODE
The experiment for byte-code is conducted as follows. Firstly, we trained the classification model with a mixed dataset consists of both packer and non-packer apps. The output model will be tested with another mixed dataset to calculate the prediction rate.
The training and testing of byte-code analysis require mixed dataset between normal and packer because we applied SVM which is a clustering classification. The split process also needs to pay attention to cases where apps have more than 1 DEX file to put in the same dataset. For these reasons, even though the input sets of the bytecode analysis process are of the same length as manifest and assets, the output statistics are not entirely identical in compare with other approaches.
Since the number of non-packer apps is bigger than the number of packers, we need to conduct the random undersampling to balance the number of apps between packers and non-packer. Fig.4 illustrates the number of apps before and after under-sampling. Also, throughout the study of packer's samples, we noticed that the ratio of packers among DEX files was not balanced, and the source code of some samples was also utilized by other packer services. Therefore, we decided to conduct the classification into two categories only: packer (all families) and non-packer. With reference from differences research fields [30] - [32] and through the experiments with other classification methods such as K-NN and naive Bayes, we decided that the use of SVM classification with RBF kernel works well in practice and yielded the best results. Grid search conducts exhausting computation through available options in a model to find the suitable configuration for the data. This grid search method helped us to confirm that our parameters are suitable for our model. Fig.5 shows the confusion matrix and cross-tab table between expected and predicted value after applying SVM classification. The classification yielded a recall value for packer is 0.99 with 2 false negative cases. The value explains the misjudgment of our model to predict packer apps as non-packer. Also, there are 7 normal apps that have been misjudged as packer. This method is suitable for detecting packer with DEX loader or packer with larger modification in original DEX classes. However, one remark of this method is it requires the balance between packer and non-packer in the training set. Another disadvantage about this method is it is difficult to determine the type of packer. As we have mentioned, the training set needs to be in balance. Though, it is not easy to collect the same number of packers for each type. For practical reason, it is better to limit this method to detect between packer and non-packer.
D. EXPERIMENTS ON ANDROID ASSETS
In this experiment, with similar train and test apps with bytecode, we have used the same 300 packer apps for training and 201 other packers for testing. We also conducted testing on 501 non-packer apps to confirm our model provides accurate result. To check whether an APK file is a packer or not, we extract all assets from the target APK file and calculate the entropy vectors for each asset. With each signature vector, we merged with target's asset vector and calculated the mutual information.
Our algorithm yields a result of 96.5% detection rate for 398/409 non-packer apps. As for identification of packers, there are 187/195 (95.8%) apps that precisely predicted by our algorithm. After analyzing on the result, we have come up with the following reason for the incorrect prediction of our model: 1) Not enough training samples, for calculating the mutual dictionary, might increase false negative rate, 2) Some non-packer libraries could contain the pattern of packers such as Jiagu and Ijiami. That incidents might resulted in false positive cases.
E. EXPERIMENTS ON ANDROID MANIFEST
Because of the imbalance in inputted data as illustrated in Fig.6 , we decided to remove family of packer which has less than 10 apps. Since our Android manifest identification model applies K-NN for classification, it will not effectively work with small number of neighbors. The training process and identification process of the Android manifest is similar to the training process in section IV-D where we created the signature vector that represents one family of packers. Plus, features extracted from manifests are represented by string values instead of entropy-based values.
The implementation yields a result of 177/196 (90%) detection rate with data set of packer for testing. Within 19 non-matched packers, 7 apps are not defined in the training. The model has detected 6/12 of the other non-matched are mixed prediction between APKProtect and Tencent, while the expected are only Tencent. The model is unable to detect 6 other packers, which belong to packers containing another pattern in comparison to those in the training set. For the non-packer dataset, our manifest approaches returned results with detection output of 195 over 201 non-packer apps. Similar to assets, the false positive cases belong to non-packer apps with similar pattern to the mutual information from trained packers.
F. DISCUSSIONS ON THE RESULTS OF THREE MODELS
In order to compare the effectiveness between proposed approaches, we calculated the precision values for both nonpacker and packer. The precision value is calculated by the formula (1) and illustrated by the Table 1 .
In the table 1, we could see that the information given by analyzing byte-code yield better result than the others. On the other hands, manifest has a low precision in detecting packer. This is understandable, since the traits leave by packers in byte-code are often greater and more obvious than in the manifest file. We also see that detecting packer through assets and libraries can give a good result. if manifest_analysis(apk) == 1 then
if assets_analysis(apk) == 1 then 10:
return integrateVal 
G. EXPERIMENTS ON INTEGRATING THE MODEL
In order to integrate the experiment results from three approaches, we have applied the algorithm 5: As illustrated in algorithm 5, we calculated the integrated value based on the detection result by the models. Specifically, when one of the models detects a packer trait, that model will return a value according to its precision value on the packers. The integrated value is an average of all values returned by three models. This value is also considered as confident point of our model to a specific APK file.
Since a confident point for an APK file does not represent as a binary output (True/False), we need to determine the threshold value. The threshold value is the point that helps us to determine whether an APK is a packer or not. We proposed three approaches to determine the threshold as illustrated in Fig.7, Fig.8 , and Fig.9: • Packer-Oriented Threshold This threshold value is determined by calculate the minimize value between confident points that belong to trained packer dataset.
• Non-Packer-Oriented Threshold This threshold value is determined by calculate the maximize value between confident points that belong to trained non-packer dataset.
• Average Threshold This value is determined by the average of the Packer-Oriented and Non-PackerOriented Threshold. 
H. COMPARISON WITH EXISTING TOOLS
To evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed method, we compared the analysis results of the integrated model with APKiD, a representative of the rule-based solution. We chose 4 types of samples for the comparison including MPD, NPD, Fake bangcle sample, and original packers (OPD). The OPD dataset is a original version of MPD before our modification. The threshold that we chose for our model to detect packer is 0.62 (which is the min threshold for 300 MPD samples that used for the training). tool that provides scanning result based on Cuckoo sandbox, a well-known dynamic analysis tool. This online tool shows that there are 54/201 samples containing proofs of packers. We examined and confirmed that the 13 samples detected by our proposed model are also among the 54 samples discovered by Virustotal. We also noticed that within 13 samples were discovered, no sample contained signs of packers in trained data. By conducting manual analysis toward those samples, we noticed that 9 samples using DEX loader technology to embed one or more byte-code files during runtime. Other 4 samples utilize the native loader technique to call the binary code during the run. This result proved that the model is able to find common features that often appear in packers such as libraries or DEX loaders.
V. KEY ISSUES AND EXPECTATIONS
Based on the result of our experiments, we have acknowledged some of the issues in our proposed model. Firstly, the distribution of packer samples in the training set is a key factor. Since our algorithms for classification based on clustered data, it is not effective to classify packers with only a single sample in the training set. Second, as the number of packer family grows, we expect our model to provide better true negative and true positive rates in comparison with the traditional method. The result provided in section IV-H has proved that our model could filter out common features in packers based on the training dataset and utilized those features to detect unknown packers. Thirdly, another disadvantage of our model is performance. Since our model is designed to analyze as much content of an APK as possible, it might take a long time to process a large size APK. One of the solutions for this problem is the use of caching method. By storing hash of assets, we could prioritize the check for packer using cached data. With cache, we only need to conduct comprehensive analysis if no packer hash is found in the cached list.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have proposed a packer identification solution by analyzing multiple components in an APK file including manifest, assets, and bytecode. The solution we come up with is based on entropy algorithms to find features that represent an amount of information. By skipping reverse engineering, this solution has enabled us to analyze applications more accurately and efficiently. Our article contributed a new research direction in detecting packers by static analysis method. Although limited by the number of packers, the experimental results of the model have shown the feasibility of applying entropy algorithms in solving packers detection problems.
